Saturday, December 26, 2009

The Koobface Gang Wishes the Industry "Happy Holidays"

Oops, they did it again - the Koobface gang, which is now officially self-describing itself as Ali Baba and the 40 Thieves LLC, has not only included a Koobface-themed -- notice the worm in the name -- background on Koobface-infected hosts, but it has also included a "Wish Koobface Happy Holidays" script -- last time I checked there were 10,000 people who clicked it -- followed by the most extensive message ever left by the gang, which is amusingly attempting to legitimize the activities of the gang.

In short, the message with clear elements of PSYOPS, attempts to position the Koobface worm as a software, where the new features are requested by users, and that by continuing its development, the authors are actually improving Facebook's security systems. For the record, the Koobface botnet itself is only the tip of the iceberg for the malicious activities the group itself is involved in. Consider going through the related Koobface research posts featured at the bottom of the post, in order to grasp the importance of how widespread and high-profile the activities of this group are. The exact message, screenshot of which is attached reads:

Our team, so often called "Koobface Gang", expresses high gratitude for the help in bug fixing, researches and documentation for our software to:
  • Kaspersky Lab for the name of Koobface and 25 millionth malicious program award;
  • Dancho Danchev ( who worked hard every day especially on our First Software & Architecture version, writing lots of e-mails to different hosting companies and structures to take down our Command-and-Control (C&C) servers, and of course analyzing software under VM Ware;
  • Trend Micro (, especially personal thanks to Jonell Baltazar, Joey Costoya, and Ryan Flores who had released a very cool document (with three parts!) describing all our mistakes we've ever made;
  • Cisco for their 3rd place to our software in their annual "working groups awards";
  • Soren Siebert with his great article; 
  • Hundreds of users who send us logs, crash reports, and wish-lists.
In fact, it was a really hard year. We've made many efforts to improve our software. Thanks to Facebook's security team - the guys made us move ahead. And we've moved. And will move. Improving their security system.

By the way, we did not have a cent using Twitter's traffic. But many security issues tell the world we did. They are wrong. As many people know, "virus" is something awful, which crashes computers, steals credential information as good as all passwords and credit cards. Our software did not ever steal credit card or online bank information, passwords or any other confidential data. And WILL NOT EVER. As for the crashes... We are really sorry. We work on it :) Wish you a good luck in new year and... Merry Christmas to you!

Always yours, "Koobface Gang

For the record, in case you were living on the other side of the universe, and weren't interested in the raw details taking place within the underground ecosystem, in July, 2009, I was the only individual ever mentioned by the Koobface gang, which back then included the following message within the command and control infrastructure for 9 days:
  • "We express our high gratitude to Dancho Danchev ( for the help in bug fixing, researches and documentation for our software."
Next to the folks at TrendMicro, the DHS also featured the event in DHS Daily Open Source Infrastructure Report for 3 September 2009 at page 18:
  • "This individual is an independent security consultant who plays an active role in tracking and shutting down botnets and other illegal operations."
It got ever more personal when the Koobface gang redirected Facebook's entire IP space to my blog in October, 2009, resulting in thousands of Facebook visits every time their crawlers were visiting a Koobface-infected host. Thankfully, Facebook's Security Incident Response Team quickly took care of the issue.

In the spirit of Christmas, I'd also like to wish the Koobface gang happy holidays, and promise them that the cherry on the top of the research pie will see daylight anytime soon. First of all, I'd like to wish them happy holidays with Frank Sinatra - "I've got you under my skin". They'll get the point.

And now comes my Christmas present, systematic take-down, blacklisting, and domain suspension of Koobface scareware operations.

Sample detection rates by Koobface binaries - go.exe; fb.79.exe; fblanding.exe; v2captcha.exe; v2webserver.exe; pack_312s3.exe (the scareware). The currently active artificial2010 .com/?pid=312s02&sid=4db12f - Email: - - AS34305; EUROACCESS Global Autonomous System acts as a redirector to the scareware domain portfolio.

Currently active portfolio of scareware domains pushed by the Koobface botnet, parked at
2010scannera1 .com - Email:
artificial2010 .com - Email:
bestdiscounts2010 .com - Email:
bestparty2009 .com - Email:
bestparty2010 .com - Email:
bestpffers2010 .com - Email:
best-wishes-design .com - Email:
bestyearparty .com - Email:
celebrate2009year .com - Email:
celebrate-designs .com - Email:
happy-newyear2010 .com - Email:
internetproscanm .com - Email:
internetproscanq .com - Email:
internetproscanr .com - Email:
internetproscanw .com - Email:
internetproscany .com - Email:
megascannera .com - Email:
megasecurityl .com - Email:
megasecurityp .com - Email:
megasecurityq .com - Email:
newholidaydesigns .com - Email:
newyearandsanta .com - Email:
newyeardesgings .com - Email:
onlinesecurityn1 .com - Email:
onlinesecurityn2 .com - Email:
onlinesecurityn3 .com - Email:
onlinesecurityn4 .com - Email:
onlinesecurityn5 .com - Email:
online-securtiyv1 .com - Email:
online-securtiyv4 .com - Email:
online-securtiyv5 .com - Email:
onlineviruskilla0 .com - Email:
onlineviruskilla2 .com - Email:
onlineviruskilla4 .com - Email:
onlineviruskilla6 .com - Email:
onlineviruskilla8 .com - Email:
santa-christmas2010 .com - Email:
snowandchristmas .com - Email:
thebestantispys .com - Email:

Christmas-themed scareware serving domains:
happy-newyear2010 .com
celebrate2009year .com
newyearandsanta .com
newyeardesgings .com
santa-christmas2010 .com
snowandchristmas .com

Speaking of AS34305; EUROACCESS Global Autonomous System, they're also hosting scareware campaigns at another IP - in particular:
pcprotect2010 .com - Email:
bestantispysoft2010 .com - Email:
worldantispyware1 .com - Email:
antispyware24x7 .com - Email:
spydetector2009 .com - Email:
myprivatesoft2009 .com - Email:
itsafetyonline .com - Email:
antispycenterprof .com - Email:
webspydetectunlim .com - Email:
pcsafetyplatinum .com - Email:
spywaredetect24pro .com - Email:
eliminater2009pro .com - Email:
pcsafety2009pro .com - Email:
securityztop .com - Email:
antisspywarescenter .com - Email:
viridentifycenter .com - Email:
antispywarets .com - Email:
winvantivirus .com - Email:
antispywaresnet .com - Email:
securityprosoft .com - Email:
onlineantispysoft .com - Email:
worldsantispysoft .com - Email:
antispyworldwideint .com - Email:
ivirusidentify .com - Email:

Within the same ASN, we can also find the following Zeus crimeware serving domains, courtesy of the Zeus Tracker:
print-design .cn - Email:
backup2009 .com - Email: - association with money mule recruitment domain registration
1211news .com - Email:
tuttakto .com - Email:
filatok .com - Email:
wwwldr .com - Email:
bbbboom .com - Email:
fant1k .com - Email:
hoooools .com - Email:
ianndex .com - Email:
vklom .com - Email:
wwwbypost .com - Email:
wwwudacha .com - Email:

Sampled scareware phones back to:
ardeana-couture .com/?b=1s1 -, parked there is also windowssp3download .com - Email:
winrescueupdate .com/download/winlogo.bmp -

Historically, (AS29073-ECATEL-AS, Ecatel Network) used to host the following scareware domains:
attention-scanner .com - Email:
be-secured2 .com - Email:
best-scanner-f .com - Email:
get-secure2 .com - Email:
installprotection2 .com - Email:
online-defense7 .com - Email:
scan-spyware2 .com - Email:
topscan2 .com - Email:
topscan3 .com - Email:
virus-pcscan .com - Email:
win-scan05 .com - Email:
win-scan07 .com - Email:
win-scan09 .com - Email:
winrescueupdate .com
winscanner01 .com - Email:
winscanner18 .com - Email:
your-protection8 .com - Email:

Happy Holidays, too!

Related Koobface research published in 2009:
Koobface-Friendly Riccom LTD - AS29550 - (Finally) Taken Offline
Koobface Botnet Starts Serving Client-Side Exploits
Massive Scareware Serving Blackhat SEO, the Koobface Gang Style
Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model - Part Two
Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model - Part One
Koobface Botnet Redirects Facebook's IP Space to my Blog
New Koobface campaign spoofs Adobe's Flash updater
Social engineering tactics of the Koobface botnet
Koobface Botnet Dissected in a TrendMicro Report
Movement on the Koobface Front - Part Two
Movement on the Koobface Front
Koobface - Come Out, Come Out, Wherever You Are
Dissecting Koobface Worm's Twitter Campaign

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. 

Tuesday, December 22, 2009

Koobface-Friendly Riccom LTD - AS29550 - (Finally) Taken Offline

Last week, Josh Kirkwood, Network Engineer at Blue Square Data Group Services Limited, with whom I've been keeping in touch regarding the blackhat SEO activity courtesy of the Koobface gang, and actual Koobface botnet activity that's been taking place there for months, pinged me with an interesting email - "Riccom are now gone" (AS29550). He also pinged the folks at hpHosts in response to their posts once again emphasizing on the malicious activity taking place there.

Since I've been analyzing Riccom LTD activity in the context of "in-the-wild" blackhat SEO campaigns launched by the Koobface gang, followed by establishing direct Koobace botnet connections, as well as sharing data with Josh, Riccom LTD clearly deserves a brief  retrospective of the malicious activity that took place there.

Malicious activity I've been analyzing since August, 2009:
Clearly, in terms of cybercrime, especially one that's monetizing an asset with high liquidity such as scareware, "better late than never" doesn't seem to sound very appropriate.

Image courtesy of TrendMicro's The Heart of Koobface - C&C and Social Network Propagation report.

Related Koobface research published in 2009:
Koobface Botnet Starts Serving Client-Side Exploits
Massive Scareware Serving Blackhat SEO, the Koobface Gang Style
Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model - Part Two
Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model - Part One
Koobface Botnet Redirects Facebook's IP Space to my Blog
New Koobface campaign spoofs Adobe's Flash updater
Social engineering tactics of the Koobface botnet
Koobface Botnet Dissected in a TrendMicro Report
Movement on the Koobface Front - Part Two
Movement on the Koobface Front
Koobface - Come Out, Come Out, Wherever You Are
Dissecting Koobface Worm's Twitter Campaign

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog.

Wednesday, November 25, 2009

Koobface Botnet Starts Serving Client-Side Exploits

UPDATED, Wednesday, December 02, 2009: The systematic rotation of new redirectors and scareware domains remains ongoing, with no signs of resuming the use of client-side exploits.

Some of the latest ones include inviteerverwhere .cn - Email: -> scanner-infoa .com - Email:, scareware detection rate; 1economyguide .cn - Email: -> superdefenceaj .com - Email:, scareware detection rate; slip-stream .cn - Email: -> getsafeantivirusa .com - Email:, scareware detection rate.

The complete list of redirectors introduced over the past week is as follows: 1economyguide .cn; 1monocline .cn; 1nonsensical .cn; 1onlinestarter .cn; 1political-news .cn; argentinastyle .cn; australiagold .cn; austriamoney .cn; beatupmean2 .cn; belgiumnation .cn; brazilcountry .cn; firefoxfowner .cn; inviteerverwhere .cn; iraqcontacts .cn; makenodifference2 .cn; manualgreese .cn; overmerit3 .cn; powerhelms2 .cn; secretalltrue2 .cn; separator2009 .cn; slip-stream .cn; solidresistance .cn; wallgreensmart .cn; windowsclone .cn; womenregrets .cn; womenregrets2 .cn

UPDATED, Saturday, November 28, 2009: Following yesterday's experiment with redirectors, relying on a "visual social engineering element" by adding descriptive domains after the original link --, which works with any generated link, the gang is now spamvertising links using Google News redirection to automatically registered Blogspot accounts, whose CAPTCHA challenge has been solved by the already infected with Koobface victims, a feature that is now mainstream, compared to the gang's previous use of commercial CAPTCHA solving services, where the price for a thousand solved CAPTCHAs varies between $1 and $2:


New redirectors introduced include:
overmerit3 .cn - Email:
belgiumnation .cn - Email:
iraqcontacts .cn - Email:
womenregrets .cn - Email:
wallgreensmart .cn - Email:
brazilcountry .cn - Email:
womenregrets2 .cn - Email:

News scareware domains introduced include:
internetdefencesystem .com - Email:
royalsecure-a1 .com - Email:
royaldefencescan1 .com - Email:
royaldefensescan1 .com - Email:
royaldefencescan .com - Email:
royaldefensescan .com - Email:
royalprotectionscan .com - Email:

Sampled copy phones back to a new domain (austin2reed .com/?b=1s1; austin2reed .com/?b=1) using the same IP ( as the previous phone-back domain.

UPDATED, Thursday, November 26, 2009: The gang has currently suspended the use of client-side exploits, let's see if it's only for the time being or indefinitely. Scareware is whatsoever, introduced with periodically registered new domains - argentinastyle .cn - Email: and australiagold .cn - Email:, redirect to bestscan066 .com - Email: and to bestscan044 .com - Email: - detection rate.

The exploit serving domains (el3x .cn; kiano-180809 .com and ttt20091124 .info) remain active.

The Koobface botnet, a case study on propagation relying exclusively on social engineering tactics and systematic abuse of legitimate Web 2.0 services, has introduced a second "game-changer" next to the migration to distributed command and control infrastructure once its centralized operations got shut down.

Next to the embedded and automatically rotating scareware redirects placed on each and every infected host part of the Koobface botnet, the gang behind it has now started officially using client-side exploits (VBS/Psyme.BM; Exploit.Pidief.EX; Exploit.Win32.IMG-WMF etc.) by embedding two iFrames on all the Koobface-infected hosts (Underground Molotov - function molot (m)), which connect to a well known (average) web malware exploitation kit's interface. Not only would a user that clicks on the Koobface URL be exposed to the Koobface binary itself, now pushed through client-side exploits, but also, to the periodically changed scareware domains.

Let's dissect the campaign, expose the entire domains portfolio involved or introduced since the beginning of the week, and once again establish a connection between the Koobface gang and money mule recruitment scams followed by scareware domains (Inst_312s2.exe; Inst_312s2.exe from today, both of them phone back to angle-meter .com/?b=1), all registered using the same emails.

Scareware redirectors seen during the past couple of the days, parked at
solidresistance .cn - Email:
separator2009 .cn - Email:
zapotec2 .cn - Email:
befree2 .cn - Email:
entombing2009 .cn - Email:
economyguide .cn - Email:
smile-life .cn - Email:
everlastmovie .cn - Email:
monocline .cn - Email:
mozzillaclone .cn - Email:
monkey-greese .cn - Email:
surgingnurse .cn - Email:
mailboxinvite .cn - Email:
flatletkick .cn - Email:
nonsensical .cn - Email:
moralisefilm .cn - Email:
firefoxavatar .cn - Email:
onlinestarter .cn - Email:
clowncirus .cn - Email:
political-news .cn - Email:
harry-pott .cn - Email:
repeatability .cn - Email:

New scareware domains portfolio parked at;;
valuewebscana .com - Email:
valuescana .com - Email:
cyber-scan-1 .com - Email:
yourantispy-1 .com - Email:
cyber-scan011 .com - Email:
cyber-scan-2 .com - Email:
antimalware-3 .com - Email:
yourmalwarescan3 .com - Email:
antimalwarescana4 .com - Email:
today-scan4 .com - Email:
antispy-scan5 .com - Email:
yourantivira7 .com - Email:
yourmalwarescan7 .com - Email:
yourantispy-8 .com - Email:
cyber-scan08 .com - Email:
cyber-scan09 .com - Email:
beprotected9 .com - Email:
spyware-scan9 .com - Email:
yourantispy-a .com - Email:
checkforspywarea .com - Email:
checkfilesherea .com - Email:
scanfilesherea .com - Email:
findprotectiona .com - Email:
checkfilesnowa .com - Email:
web-scanm .com - Email:
today-scann .com - Email:
4eay-protection .com - Email:

The client-side exploit redirection takes place through three separate domains, all involved in previous Zeus crimeware campaigns, parked on the same IP in a cybercrime-friendly ASN. For instance, - - Email: redirects to -> -> -> using VBS/Psyme.BM; Exploit.Pidief.EX; Exploit.Win32.IMG-WMF etc. pushing load.exe, which phones back to a well known "leftover" from Koobface botnet's centralized infrastructure - xtsd20090815 .com/adm/index.php.

Now it gets even more interesting, with the Koobface gang clearly rubbing shoulders with authors of actual web malware exploitation kits, who diversify their cybercrime operations by participating in money mule recruitment scams, zeus crimeware serving campaigns, and scareware.

Parked on where the first iFrame is hosted, are also the following domains participating in related campaigns:
amer0test0 .cn - Email: -> money mule recruitment
antivirusfreec0 .cn - Email: -> money mule recruitment 
arendanomer2 .cn - Email:
dom0cn .cn - Email:
dom1cn .cn - Email:
dom2cn .cn - Email:
domx0 .cn - Email:
domx1 .cn - Email:
domx2 .cn - Email:
dox0 .cn - Email:
dox1 .cn - Email:
dox2 .cn - Email:
dox3 .cn - Email:
edit2china .cn - Email:
edit3china .cn - Email:
el1x .cn - Email:
el2x .cn - Email:
el3x .cn - Email:
gym0replace .cn - Email: -> scareware domain registration
herosima1yet .cn - Email:
herosima1yet00g .cn - Email:
otherchina .cn - Email:
parliament .tk - Email:
privet1 .cn - Email:
privet2 .cn - Email:
privet3 .cn - Email:
sport-lab .cn - Email: -> money mule recruitment domain registrations
trafdomins .cn - Email:

The second iFrame domain parked at redirects in the following way - kiano-180809 .com/oko/help.html - - Email: leads to kiano-180809 .com/oko/dyna_soc.html -> kiano-180809 .com/oko/tomato_guy_13.html -> kiano-180809 .com/oko/update.vbe -> kiano-180809 .com/oko/dyna_wm.wmf.

The same exploitation structure is valid for the third iFrame domain - ttt20091124 .info/oko/help.html which is again, parked at and was embedded at Koobface-infected hosts over the past 24 hours.

What prompted this shift on behalf of the Koobface gang? Declining infection rates -- I'm personally not seeing a decline in the click-through rate, with over 500 clicks on a spamvertised Kooobface URL over a period of 24 hours -- or their obsession with traffic optimization? In terms of social engineering, the periodic introduction of new templates proved highly successful for the gang, but the newly introduced outdated client-side exploits can in fact generate more noise than they originally anticipated, if they were to continue relying on social engineering vectors only.

One thing's certain - the Koobface gang is now on the offensive, and it would be interesting to see whether they'd introduce a new exploits set, or continue relying on the one offered by the web exploitation kit.

Related posts:
Secunia: Average insecure program per PC rate remains high
Research: 80% of Web users running unpatched versions of Flash/Acrobat
Fake Security Software Domains Serving Exploits
Massive Scareware Serving Blackhat SEO, the Koobface Gang Style
Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model - Part Two
Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model - Part One
Koobface Botnet Redirects Facebook's IP Space to my Blog
New Koobface campaign spoofs Adobe's Flash updater
Social engineering tactics of the Koobface botnet
Koobface Botnet Dissected in a TrendMicro Report
Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model
Movement on the Koobface Front - Part Two
Movement on the Koobface Front
Koobface - Come Out, Come Out, Wherever You Are
Dissecting Koobface Worm's Twitter Campaign
Dissecting the Koobface Worm's December Campaign
Dissecting the Latest Koobface Facebook Campaign 
The Koobface Gang Mixing Social Engineering Vectors

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog.

Tuesday, November 17, 2009

Massive Scareware Serving Blackhat SEO, the Koobface Gang Style

Ali Baba and the 40 thieves LLC are once again multi-tasking, this time compromising hundreds of thousands of web sites, and redirecting Google visitors -- through the standard http referrer check -- to scareware serving domains.

What's so special about the domains mentioned in Cyveillance's post, as well as the ones currently active on this campaign? It's the Koobface connection.

For instance, the ionisationtools .cn or moored2009 .cn redirectors, as well as the scareware serving premium-protection6 .com;; checkalldata .com; foryoumalwarecheck4 .com; antispy-scan1 .com mentioned in post, are the same scareware redirectors and domains analyzed in part two of the Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model series. The identical structure on a sampled Koobface infected host and a sampled compromised site can be seen in the attached screenshots.

The redirection "magic" takes place through a what looks like a static css.js (Trojan-Downloader.JS.FraudLoad) uploaded on all of the affected sites. The very latest blackhat SEO once again puts the Koobface gang in the spotlight of the ongoing underground multi-tasking that the majority of cybercriminals engage in these days.

Related posts:
Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model - Part Two
Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model - Part One
Koobface Botnet Redirects Facebook's IP Space to my Blog
New Koobface campaign spoofs Adobe's Flash updater
Social engineering tactics of the Koobface botnet
Koobface Botnet Dissected in a TrendMicro Report
Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model
Movement on the Koobface Front - Part Two
Movement on the Koobface Front
Koobface - Come Out, Come Out, Wherever You Are
Dissecting Koobface Worm's Twitter Campaign
Dissecting the Koobface Worm's December Campaign
Dissecting the Latest Koobface Facebook Campaign 
The Koobface Gang Mixing Social Engineering Vectors

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog.

Wednesday, November 11, 2009

Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model - Part Two

UPDATED - Wednesday, November 18, 2009: A new update is pushed to the hundreds of thousands infected hosts, which is now performing the redirection using dynamically generated .swf files, with every page using the same title "Wonderful Video". The redirection is also a relatively static process.

For instance, if the original koobface redirector is, followed by the .swf redirection it will output

New redirectors and scareware domains pushed within the past few hours include - everlastmovie .cn - Email:; smile-life .cn - Email: ; harry-pott .cn - Email:, beprotected9 .com - Email: and antivir3 .com - Email:

UPDATED - Tuesday, November 17, 2009: Koobface is resuming scareware (Inst_312s2.exe) operations at which was taken offline for a short period of time. ISP has been notified again, action should be taken shortly. The current domain portfolio including new ones parked there: 

ereuqba .cn - Email:
eqoxyda .cn - Email:
evouga .cn - Email:
edivuka .cn - Email:
ebeama .cn - Email:
kebugac .cn - Email:
eqoabce .cn - Email:
kixyhce .cn - Email:
cecyde .cn - Email:
evybine .cn - Email:
eqaone .cn - Email:
dyqunre .cn - Email:
byzivte .cn - Email:
dovzyag .cn - Email:
ebeozag .cn - Email:
cafgouh .cn - Email:
kebfoki .cn - Email:
ebogumi .cn - Email:
dyzani .cn - Email:
dybapi .cn - Email:
dusyti .cn - Email:
dutsyvi .cn - Email:
dutfij .cn - Email:
bysivak .cn - Email:
eqiovak .cn - Email:

cecxoyk .cn - Email:
dyqkuam .cn - Email:
edamym .cn - Email:
eqibuym .cn - Email:
ducyqan .cn - Email:
duzebyn .cn - Email:
etyawjo .cn - Email:
cerdiko .cn - Email:
erauso .cn - Email:
etuacwo .cn - Email:
etuexyp .cn - Email:
etywuq .cn - Email:
ebejar .cn - Email:
ebiuhas .cn - Email:
dozabes .cn - Email:
eqoybu .cn - Email:
eviyzru .cn - Email:
evaopsu .cn - Email:
ebaetu .cn - Email:
dytrevu .cn - Email:
eboezu .cn - Email:
eruqav .cn - Email:
eqoumiv .cn - Email:
epuneyv .cn - Email:
etykauw .cn - Email:
ebeoxuw .cn - Email:
eqidax .cn - Email:
evaolux .cn - Email:
cafropy .cn - Email:
etyupy .cn - Email:
kebquty .cn - Email:
cakevy .cn - Email:
eqouwy .cn - Email:
epuvyiz .cn - Email: 

UPDATED - Monday, November 16, 2009: The Koobface gang is pushing a new update, followed by a new portfolio of scareware redirectors and actual scareware serving domains.

New portfolio of redirectors parked at
befree2 .cn - Email:
scandinavianmall .cn - Email: 
densityoze .cn - Email:
moored2009 .cn - Email:
pica-pica .cn - Email:
stroboscopicmovie .cn - Email:
comedienne .cn - Email:
densityoze .cn - Email:
furorcorner .cn - Email:
ionisationtools .cn - Email:
wax-max .cn - Email:
plate-tracery .cn - Email:
little-bitty .cn - Email:
night-whale .cn - Email:
scary-scary .cn - Email:

Second redirectors portfolio at
disorganization000 .cn - Email:
rainbowlike .cn - Email:
skewercall .cn - Email:
wegenerinfo .cn - Email:
kangaroocar .cn - Email:
pericallis .cn - Email:
treasure-planet .cn - Email:
genusbiz .cn - Email:

Currently pushing scareware from primescan1 .com -;;; Sampled scareware phones back to windowsupdate8 .com/download/timesroman.tif - and angle-meter .com/?b=1 (safewebnetwork .com) -

More scareware domains are parked on the same IPs:
yourantivira7 .com - Email: - detection rate
web-scanm .com - Email: - detection rate
yourantivira3 .com (wwwsecurescana1 .com) - Email:
primescan8 .com
online-check-v11 .com
antivir-scan1 .com - Email:
antispy-scan1 .com - Email:
primescan1 .com
checkforspyware2 .com - Email:
pc-antispyware3 .com - Email:
premium-protection6 .com - Email:
antivir7 .com - Email:
online-check-v7 .com
beprotected8 .com - Email:
pc-antispyware9 .com - Email:
online-check-v9 .com
checkfileshere .com - Email:
scanfileshere .com - Email:
antivir-scano .com - Email:
check-files-now .com - Email:
antivir-scanz .com - Email:
antispy-scanz .com - Email:

ISP's contributing the the monetization of Koobface have been notified.

UPDATE: has been taken offline courtesy of Blue Square Data Group Services Limited -- previous cooperation took place within a 3 hour period -- with the Koobface gang migrating scareware operations to (AS29073 ECATEL-AS , Ecatel Network) and; - (AS24940, HETZNER-AS Hetzner Online AG RZ) - ISPs have been notified.

The .info scareware domain portfolio will be suspended within the next 24 hours.

Ali Baba and the 40 thieves LLC a.k.a my Ukrainian "fan club", the one with the Bahama botnet connection, the recent malvertising attacks connection, and the current market leader of black hat search engine optimization campaigns, has been keeping themselves busy over the past couple of weeks, continuing to add additional layers of legitimacy into their campaigns ( redirectors to accounts leading to compromised hosts), proving that if a cybercrime enterprise wants to, it can run its malicious operations on the shoulders of legitimate service providers using them as "virtual human shield" in order to continue its operations without fear of retribution.
Over the past two weeks, the Koobface gang once again indicated that it reads my blog, "appreciates" the ways I undermine the monetization element of their campaigns, and next to redirecting Facebook's entire IP space to my blog, they've also, for the first time ever, moved from using my name in their redirectors, to typosquatting it.

For instance, the -- now suspended -- Koobface domain pancho-2807 .com is registered to Pancho Panchev,, followed by rdr20090924 .info registered to Vancho Vanchev, As always, I'm totally flattered, and I'm still in a "stay tuned" mode for my very own branded scareware release - the Advanced Pro-Danchev Premium Live Mega Professional Anti-Spyware Online Cleaning Cyber Protection Scanner 2010.

It's time to summarize some of the Koobface gang's recent activities, establish a direct connection with the Bahama botnet, the Ukrainian dating scam agency Confidential Connections whose botnet operations were linked to money-mule recruitment scams, with active domains part of their affiliate network parked at a Koobface-connected scareware serving domains, followed by the fact that they're all responding to an IP involved in the ongoing U.S Federal Forms themed blackhat SEO campaign. It couldn't get any uglier.

As of recently the gang has migrated to a triple-layer of legitimate infrastructure, consisting of redirectors, leading to automatically registered Blogspot account which redirect to Koobface infected hosts serving the Koobface binary and the redirecting to a periodically updated scareware domain. Here are some of the domains involved.

Ongoing campaing dynamically generating URLs redirecting to automatically registered Blogspot accounts, using the following URLs: /VumFK -> drbryanferazzoli /lJcK3 -> toyetoyebalnaja /3mFyzs -> raimeishelkowitz /2wuSPj -> kelakelamccovery /2Pnn8l -> pattyedevero /2wuSPj -> kelakelamccovery /1HDmbm -> malinegainey-green. /2xf5vB -> advaadvarukuni /3mFyzs -> raimeishelkowitz /2xf5vB -> advaadvarukuni /46pcCI -> paulangelogaetano /1HDmbm -> malinegainey-green /3JZsDD -> derieuwsdarrius /lJcK3 -> toyetoyebalnaja /2h7XRU -> shunnarahamandla /3JZsDD -> derieuwsdarrius /3Zj98G -> schubachmarquis /1sXgRH -> nicnicmiralles /3eijza -> froneksaxxon /1I3rr7 -> attreechappy /2m3wP4 -> bilsboroughkebrom /30wcJn -> raheelanucci /2U7jYM -> orvelorvelblues /1CWOlZ -> kondrackinehemias /2m3wP4 -> bilsboroughkebrom /1qbXsi -> lizzamottymotty /79ONz -> rayvongonsalves /22Jyex -> klaartjebjorgvinsson /p07jC -> humphriesteelateela /2lpZXx -> kalandraaleisha

The Blogspot accounts consist of a single post of automatically syndicated news item, which compared to previous campaign which relied on 25+ Koobface infected IPs directly embedded at Blogspot itself, this time relies on a single URL which attempts to connect to any of the Koobface infected IPs embedded on it. The currently active campaign redirects to rainbowlike cn/?pid=312s02&sid=4db12f, which then redirects to the scareware domain secure-your-files .com, with the sample phoning back to forbes-2009 .com/?b=1s1 -, with another domain parked there activate-antivirus .com - Email:

Time to expose the entire portfolio of scareware domains pushed by the gang, and offer some historical OSINT data on their activities which were not publicly released until enough connections between multiple campaigns were established.Which ISPs are currently offering hosting services for the scareware domains portfolio pushed by the Koobface gang? The current portfolio is parked at (AS36351 SOFTLAYER Technologies Inc. surprise, surprise!); (AS44042 ROOT eSolutions surprise, surprise part two) and at (AS44042 ROOT eSolutions).

Scareware redirectors parked at
rainbowlike .cn - Email:
authorized-payments .com - Email:
poltergeist2000 .cn - Email:
sestiad2 .cn - Email:
uninformed2 .cn - Email:
retrocession2 .cn - Email:
unimpressible3 .cn - Email:
uncrown3 .cn - Email:
sneak-peak .cn - Email:
cellostuck .cn - Email:
stinkingthink .cn - Email:
skewercall .cn - Email:
be-spoken .cn - Email:
transmitteron .cn - Email:
kangaroocar .cn - Email:
pericallis .cn - Email:
exponentials .cn - Email:
triforms .cn - Email:
outperformoly .cn - Email:
genusbiz .cn - Email:

Scareware domains parked at; and
anti-malware-scan-for-you .com - Email: information@brunter.sw
available-scanner .com - Email:
bewareofspyware .com - Email:
defender-scan-for-you .com - Email: information@brunter.sw
defender-scan-for-you3 .com - Email:
foryoumalwarecheck .com - Email: information@brunter.sw
friends-protection .com - Email:
further-scan .com - Email:
goodonlineprotection .com - Email:
good-scans .com - Email:
guidetosecurity3 .com - Email:
howtocleanpc2 .com - Email:
howtoprotectpc3 .com - Email:
howtosecure2 .com - Email:
howtosecurea .com - Email:
how-to-secure-pc2 .com - Email:
protection-secrets .com - Email:
scan-for-you .com - Email: information@brunter.sw
scannerantimalware2 .com
scannerantimalware4 .com
scannerantimalware6 .com
secure-your-data0 .com - Email:
secure-your-files .com - Email:
security-guide5 .com - Email:
security-info1 .com - Email:
security-tips3 .com - Email:
security-tools4 .com - Email:
webviruscheck1 .com
webviruscheck-4 .com
webviruscheck5 .com

Let us further expand the portfolio by listing the newly introduced scareware domains at, which was first mentioned in part one of the Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model as a centralized hosting location for the gang's portfolio.

Scareware domains parked at
g-antivirus .com - Email:
generalantivirus com - Email:
general-antivirus .com - Email:
general-av .com - Email:
generalavs .com - Email:
gobackscan .com - Email:
gobarscan .com - Email:
godeckscan .com - Email:
godirscan .com - Email:
godoerscan .com - Email:
goeachscan .com - Email:
goeasescan .com - Email:
gofatescan .com - Email:
gofowlscan .com - Email:
gohandscan .com - Email:
goherdscan .com - Email:
goironscan. com - Email:
gojestscan. com - Email:
golimpscan. com - Email:
golookscan. com - Email:
gomendscan. com - Email:
gomutescan. com - Email:
gonamescan. com - Email:

goneatscan .com - Email:
gopickscan. com - Email:
gorestscan. com - Email:
goroomscan. com - Email:
gosakescan. com - Email:
goscanadd. com - Email:
goscanback .com - Email:
goscanbar .com - Email:
goscancode .com - Email:
goscandeck. com - Email:
goscandir. com - Email:
goscandoer .com - Email:
goscanease. com - Email:
goscanfowl. com - Email:
goscanhand. com - Email:
goscanherd. com - Email:
goscanjest. com - Email:
goscanlike. com - Email:
goscanlimp. com - Email:
goscanmend .com - Email:
goscanname. com - Email:
goscanneat .com - Email:
goscanpick. com - Email:

goscanref. com - Email:
goscanrest .com - Email:
goscanroom .com - Email:
goscansake. com - Email:
goscanslip. com - Email:
goscansole .com - Email:

goscantoil. com - Email:
goscantrio. com - Email:
goscanxtra. com - Email:
gosolescan. com - Email:
gotoilscan. com - Email:
gotrioscan. com - Email:
gowellscan. com - Email:
goxtrascan. com - Email:
iantiviruspro .com - Email:
iantivirus-pro .com - Email:
ia-pro .com - Email:
iav-pro .com - Email:
in5ch .com - Email:
in5cs .com - Email:
in5ct .com - Email:
in5id .com - Email:
in5it .com - Email:
in5iv .com - Email:
in5st .com - Email:
inavpro .com - Email:
scanatom6 .com - Email:
windoptimizer .com - Email:
wopayment .com - Email:
woptimizer .com - Email:

cafropy .cn - Email:
cakevy .cn - Email:
dotqyuw .cn - Email:
dovnaji .cn - Email:
dovzyag .cn - Email:
dozabes .cn - Email:
ducyqan .cn - Email:
duvaba .cn - Email:
duvegy .cn - Email:
duwbiec .cn - Email:
duxsoez .cn - Email:
duzebyn .cn - Email:
dybapi .cn - Email:
dyqkuam .cn - Email:
dyqunre .cn - Email:
dytrevu .cn - Email:
dyzani .cn - Email:
ebaetu .cn - Email:
ebeoxuw .cn - Email:
ebeozag .cn - Email:
edoqeg .cn - Email:
epuneyv .cn - Email:
epuvyiz .cn - Email:

eqadozu .cn - Email:
eqaofed .cn - Email:
eqaone .cn - Email:
eqayweh .cn - Email:
eqibuym .cn - Email:
eqidax .cn - Email:
eqiovak .cn - Email:
eqoabce .cn - Email:
eqoumiv .cn - Email:
erauso .cn - Email:
ereuqba .cn - Email:
erujale .cn - Email:
eruqav .cn - Email:
esuteyb .cn - Email:
etuacwo .cn - Email:
etuexyp .cn - Email:
etyawjo .cn - Email:
etykauw .cn - Email:
evaolux .cn - Email:
evaopsu .cn - Email:
keturma .cn - Email:
kevsopi .cn - Email:
kijxayt .cn - Email:
kiluxso .cn - Email:
kipuxo .cn - Email:
kirdabe .cn - Email:
kiwraux .cn - Email:
kixyhce .cn - Email:

adjudg .info - Email:
afront .info - Email:
anprun .info - Email:
apalet .info - Email:
argier .info - Email:
asbro .info - Email:
atquit .info - Email:
atwain .info - Email:
bagse .info - Email:
bedaub .info - Email:
bedrid .info - Email:
beeves .info - Email:
besort .info - Email:
bettev .info - Email:
bettre .info - Email:
birnam .info - Email:
botled .info - Email:
brawns .info - Email:
brisky .info - Email:
camlet .info - Email:
caretz .info - Email:
cheir .info - Email:
cuique .info - Email:
daphni .info - Email:

deble .info - Email:
debuty .info - Email:
declin. info - Email:
devicel .info -
dislik. info - Email:
dolchi. info - Email:
dolet. info - Email:
dolet. info - Email:
droope .info - Email:
empery .info - Email:
engirt .info - Email:
eratile .info - Email:
erpeer .info - Email:
evyns. info - Email:
exampl .info - Email:
extrip .info - Email:
fatted .info - Email:
fedar. info - Email:
fifthz .info - Email:
figgle .info - Email:
fliht .info - Email:
fosset .info - Email:
freckl .info - Email:
freiny. info - Email:

froday. info - Email:
fulier. info - Email:
gaudad .info - Email:
gelded. info - Email:
gicke .info - Email:
girded .info - Email:
goterm .info - Email:
guiany. info - Email:
haere .info - Email:
hilloa. info - Email:
holdit. info - Email:
hownet .info - Email:
ignomy. info - Email:
implor. info - Email:
inclin. info - Email:
inquir .info - Email:
jorgan .info - Email:
kedder .info - Email:
knivel .info - Email:
krapen .info - Email:
lavolt .info - Email:
lavyer .info - Email:

lequel .info - Email:
lowatt .info - Email: - Email: - Email:
midid .info - Email:
miloty .info - Email:
mobled .info - Email:
monast. info - Email:
moont. info - Email:
narowz .info - Email:
nevils .info - Email:
nnight .info - Email:
nroof .info - Email:
numben .info - Email:
obsque .info - Email:
octian .info - Email:
odest. info - Email:
onclew .info - Email:
orifex .info - Email:
orodes .info - Email:
outliv .info - Email:

pante .info - Email:
pasio .info - Email:
pittie. info - Email:
plamet .info - Email:
plazec. info - Email:
potinz. info - Email:
pplay. info - Email:
pretia .info - Email:
quoifs. info - Email:
qward. info - Email:
raught .info - Email:
realfly .info - Email:
reglet. info - Email:
rogero .info - Email:
sallut. info - Email:
sawme .info - Email:
scarre .info - Email:
scrowl. info - Email:
sigeia. info - Email:
sighal. info - Email:
speen. info - Email:
spelem .info - Email:
spinge. info - Email:
squach. info - Email:

stampo. info - Email:
steepy. info - Email:
strawy. info - Email:
suivez. info - Email:
sundery .info - Email:
surnam. info - Email:
swoln. info - Email:
swoons .info - Email:
taulus. info - Email:
tenshy. info - Email:
tented. info - Email:
ticedu. info - Email:
tithed. info - Email:
topful. info - Email:
unclin. info - Email:
undeaf. info - Email:
unowed. info - Email:
unwept. info - Email:
usicam. info - Email:
vagrom. info - Email:
veldun. info - Email:
vipren. info - Email:
voided. info - Email:
volsce. info - Email:
washy. info - Email:
wincot. info - Email:
wiving. info - Email:
wooer. info - Email:
xonker. info - Email: 

Historical OSINT of Koobface scareware activity over a period of two weeks
The following is a snapshot of Koobface scareware activity during the last two weeks, establishing a direct connection between the Koobface botnet, the ongoing blackhat SEO campaigns, the Bahama botnet with scareware samples modifying HOSTS files, and an Ukrainian dating scam agency where the gang appears to be part of an affiliate network.

Scareware samples pushed by Koobface, with associated detection rates:
mexcleaner .in - Email:
safetyscantool .com - - Email:
stabilitytoolsonline .com - Email:
securitytestnetonline .com - - Email:
securityprogramguide .com - Email:
cheapsecurityscan .com - Email:
securitycheckwest .com; webbiztest .com - Email:
securitycodereviews .com - - Email:
netmedtest .com - - Email:
toolsdirectnow .com - Email:
(ratspywawe .in; wqdefender .in; pivocleaner .in; mexcleaner .in; sapesoft .in; alsoft .in; samosoft .in; jastaspy .in; lastspy .in; felupdate .info; inkoclear .info; drlcleaner .info; tiposoft .info; fkupd .eu; piremover .eu; igsoft .eu; sersoft .eu) - detection rate

Download locations of the actual scareware binary used over the past two weeks:
0ni9o1s3feu60 .cn - Email:
6j5aq93iu7yv4 .cn - Email:
mf6gy4lj79ny5 .cn - Email:
84u9wb2hsh4p6 .cn - Email:
6pj2h8rqkhfw7 .cn - Email:
7cib5fzf462g8 .cn - Email:
7bs5nfzfkp8q8 .cn - Email:
kt4lwumfhjb7a .cn - Email:
q2bf0fzvjb5ca .cn - Email:
rncocnspr44va .cn - Email:
t1eayoft9226b .cn - Email:
4go4i9n76ttwd .cn - Email:
kzvi4iiutr11e .cn - Email:
hxc7jitg7k57e .cn - Email:
mfbj6pquvjv8e .cn - Email:
mt3pvkfmpi7de .cn - Email:
fb7pxcqyb45oe .cn - Email:
fyivbrl3b0dyf .cn - Email:
z6ailnvi94jgg .cn - Email:
ue4x08f5myqdl .cn - Email:
p7keflvui9fkl .cn - Email:
gjpwsc5p7oe3m .cn - Email:
f1uq1dfi3qkcm .cn - Email:
7mx1z5jq0nt3o .cn - Email:
3uxyctrlmiqeo .cn - Email:
p0umob9k2g7mp .cn - Email:
od32qjx6meqos .cn - Email:
bnfdxhae1rgey .cn - Email:
7zju2l82i2zhz .cn - Email:

What's the deal with the historical OSINT and why wasn't this data communicated right away? Keep reading.

The Bahama Botnet Connection
During September, the folks at ClickForensics made an interesting observation regarding my Ukrainian "fan club" and the ad revenue stealing/click-fraud committing botnet Bahama - some of the scareware samples were modifying the HOSTS file and presenting the victim with "one of those cybecrime-friendly search engines" stealing revenue in the process.

Once the connection was also established by me at a later stage, data released in regard to the New York Times malvertising attack once again revealed a connection between all campaigns - the very same domains used to serve the scareware, were also used in a blackhat SEO campaign which I analyzed a week before the incident took place. Basically, the scareware pushed by the Koobface botnet, as well as the scareware pushed by the blackhat SEO campaigns maintained by the gangs is among the several propagation approaches used for the DNS records poisoning to take place:

"However, in the case of the Bahama Botnet, this DNS translation method gets corrupted.  The Bahama botnet malware causes the infected computer to mistranslate a domain name.  Instead of translating “” as, an infected computer will translate it as That number doesn’t represent any computer owned by Google.  Instead, it represents a computer located in Canada.  When a user with an infected machine performs a search on what they think is, the query actually goes to the Canadian computer, which pulls real search results directly from Google, fiddles with them a bit, and displays them to the searcher.  

Now the searcher is looking at a page that looks exactly like the Google search results page, but it’s not.  A click on the apparently “organic” results will redirect as a paid click through several ad networks or parked domains — some complicit, some not.  Regardless, cost per click (CPC) fees are generated, advertisers pay, and click fraud has occurred."

The mentioned is actually AS30407 (Velcom), which has also been used in recent campaigns.

ISP and domain registrars have been notified, action should be taken shortly. What was particularly interesting to observe was scareware pushed by the Koobface botnet phoning back to its well known urodinam .net/8732489273.php domain, was also modifying the HOSTS file in the following way. Sample HOSTS modification of scareware (MD5: 0x0FBF1A9F8E6E305138151440DA58B4F1) pushed by Koobface:

Sample HOSTS modification of scareware (MD5: 0x0FBF1A9F8E6E305138151440DA58B4F1) pushed by blackhat SEO:

The historical OSINT paragraph mentioned that several of the scareware domains pushed during the past two weeks were responding to This very same IP was hosting domains part of an Ukrainian dating scam agency known as Confidential Connections earlier this year, whose spamming operations were linked to a botnet involved in money mule recruitment activities.

For the time being, the following dating scam domains are responding to the same IP:
healthe-lovesite .com - Email:
love-isaclick .com - Email:
love-is-special .com - Email:
only-loveall .com - Email:
and-i-loveyoutoo .com - Email:
andiloveyoutoo .com - Email:
romantic-love-forever .com - Email:

love-youloves .com - Email:
love-galaxys .com - Email:
love-formeandyou .com - Email:
ifound-thelove .net - Email:
findloveon .net - Email:
love-isexcellent .net - Email:

Could it get even more malicious and fraudulent than that? Appreciate my thetoric. The same email ( that was used to register the dating scam domains was also used to register exploit serving domains at, participate in phishing campaigns, and register a money mule recruitment site for the non-existent Allied Insurance LLC. (Allied Group, Inc.).

Now that's a multi-tasking underground enterprise, isn't it? The ISPs have been notified, domains suspension is pending.

Related posts:
Koobface Botnet Redirects Facebook's IP Space to my Blog
New Koobface campaign spoofs Adobe's Flash updater
Social engineering tactics of the Koobface botnet
Koobface Botnet Dissected in a TrendMicro Report
Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model
Movement on the Koobface Front - Part Two
Movement on the Koobface Front
Koobface - Come Out, Come Out, Wherever You Are
Dissecting Koobface Worm's Twitter Campaign
Dissecting the Koobface Worm's December Campaign
Dissecting the Latest Koobface Facebook Campaign 
The Koobface Gang Mixing Social Engineering Vectors

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog.